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Setting an optimal ﬁscal policy in oil-producing countries is challenging, due to the
exhaustibility of oil resources and unpredictability of oil prices. Recently it has become
popular among oil-producing countries to establish oil revenue funds, which are believed
to stabilize the economy and provide inter-generational redistribution of oil wealth. The
effectiveness of oil revenue funds and their design have received considerable attention
from researchers and policymakers recently. Using empirical model, it is found that an oil
revenue fund in Kazakhstan stabilized the government expenditure, but did not stabilize
real effective exchange rates.
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Oil-producing countries often face the “Resource curse”
coming from the volatility, exhaustibility and uncertainty
of resources. Some countries create an oil revenue fund
(fund) as a mechanism to reduce the impact of volatile
revenue on the government and the economy (Davis,
Ossowski, Daniel, & Barnett, 2001). There is an opinion
that oil revenue funds can help oil-producing countries
avoid the “Resource curse”.
Controversy exists in the literature about the impact of
funds, which discuss whether the creation of funds have a
positive effect on economy. The results of Davis et al. (2001)
show no signiﬁcant effect of the creation of funds on gov-
ernment expenditure. Results of Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007)
show a signiﬁcant effect of funds on inﬂation, broad money
volatility and price volatility.
The existing literature studies only the effect of the exis-
tence of funds, but not the role ofﬁscal policy. The creation of
funds may not be enough for oil-producing economies to
avoid volatility and achieve higher growth. The creation of
funds is not always an easy or appropriate solution to prob-
lems arising in oil-producing economies. Whether theuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
U
S
D
/b
ar
re
l
2007m1 2007m7 2008m1 2008m7 2009m1
Fig. 1. World oil prices. Data source: The Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.
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depend on whether the appropriate ﬁscal policies are in
place. Recent volatility in oil prices hasmade this question far
more relevant to many oil-dependent countries (Fig. 1).
This paper attempts to answer the question “How does
ﬁscal policy affect oil revenue fund in Kazakhstan and how
effective is this fund? ”. In this paper, the term ﬁscal policy is
narrowed down to include only taxation of oil, the existence
of a fundand its size. Taxationof resources is a combinationof
per unit, per revenue and lump sum taxes. An appropriate
design of ﬁscal policy is signiﬁcant to avoid high volatility of
oil revenue: per-revenue tax allows for higher revenuewhen
the resource price is high; per unit tax allows a country to
secure resource revenue even when resource price is low;
and lump sum tax allows a country to receive revenue even
whenthe level of oil production is low.Countries set different
taxes on resources and change them over time.
The theoretical model and the empirical model for the
effect of taxation of resources (value-added tax, tax on oil
exports and signiﬁcant changes in oil taxation in 2004 and
2009) on its production are developed in this paper. To sup-
port the theoretical model the effects of ﬁscal policy on oil
production, the fund’s revenue and gross international re-
serves (GIR) in Kazakhstan were estimated using data for
Kazakhstan over the period January 1994–July 2013. The ef-
fect of the establishment of a fund and changes in its accu-
mulationandwithdrawal rulesand its impactonstabilization
of governmentexpenditure andREERwere shownusingdata
for Kazakhstan over the period January 1994–July 2013.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a
review of existing literature studying the effect of taxation
on oil production and oil exploration (Section 2.1) and the
effect of oil revenue funds on the economy (Section 2.2).
Section 3 describes ﬁscal policy in Kazakhstan. A theoretical
model showing the effect of constant, price-dependent and
quantity-dependent ad valorem taxes on oil production and
oil exploration assuming variable oil prices is developed in
Section 4. Empirical models showing the effect of taxes on oil
production and exploration and showing the effect of oil
revenue funds on government expenditure and REER are
developed in Section 5. Conclusions are in Section 6. The
main contributions of this chapter are in Sections 4.2.3 and 5.2. Literature review
2.1. The effect of taxation on oil production and oil
exploration
Research on the taxation of oil for most oil-producing
countries, such as the OPEC nations, the Gulf countries,
Mexico, Norway, UK, and the USA, is abundant. Research in
this area for Kazakhstan is lacking.
In order to understand the model of how taxes affect oil
production and oil exploration, it is important to under-
stand the main principles of oil taxation. Boadway and
Flatters (1993) provide principles and policy issues for
taxation of both renewable and nonrenewable natural re-
sources. They provide policy issues of different taxes on
natural resources such as export taxes, production taxes,
royalties, and property taxes. The authors argue that export
taxes discriminate between the domestic resource market
and the world resource market and are frequently used by
developing countries as a source of revenue. If the portion
of resources consumed domestically is too small compared
to the amount exported, which is the case in many coun-
tries, there is no additional efﬁciency for the domestic
market due to this discrimination. The authors note that
many countries have tended to eliminate export taxes on
natural resources in favor of other more general taxes.
Boadway and Flatters (1993) predict that “Even in cases
where the resource-exporting country might have a long
term comparative advantage in further processing, the use
of export taxes to speed up process can be very costly.”
(Boadway & Flatters,1993, p. 49). They provide principles of
taxation of nonrenewable natural resources, including
export tax, and provides intuition of their implementation.
According to the paper, taxes on oil can have a different
effect on oil production depending on whether the tax rate
is per unit or ad valorem. Also, tax rates can be constant or
variable with price, quantity or quality of oil. Literature that
provides analysis of the tax effect on oil production exists.
One such study is that of Conrad and Hool (1984), which
comes up with a model measuring the effect of taxes on
intertemporal extraction of mineral resources. The authors
build models showing effects of different types of taxes on
D. Azhgaliyeva / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 157–183 159oil production (per unit, ad valorem and proﬁts taxes). They
examined not only ﬁxed-rate taxes, but also variable-rate
taxes. They distinguish between three basic types of vari-
able tax rates: time-dependent per unit taxes, price-
dependent ad valorem taxes and progressive proﬁt taxes.
Conrad and Hool (1984) deﬁne each of these taxes as
following: the tax base for a variable per unit tax is an
amount of output sold and the tax rate of the per unit tax
may vary over time; a variable ad valorem tax rate is set as a
percentage of market value of output sold and the tax rate
per unit may vary with price (a higher tax rate is set for
higher price); a progressive proﬁt tax is set as a percentage
of company’s proﬁt and the rate of the tax is set at a rate
progressive to the proﬁt. Conrad and Hool (1984) build a
model to show the effect of variable-rate taxes on a com-
pany’s decision of optimal production and exploration. The
authors ﬁnd that variability in taxes, whether they vary
with output, value, or proﬁts, affects allocation incentives
differently than if tax rates are ﬁxed. This difference de-
pends on whether the growth of tax rate is sufﬁciently
different from the discount rate. The limitation of Conrad
and Hool (1984) is that they analyze the intertemporal
problem of extraction choice for only two periods, thus a
lifetime of reserves is given.
Unlike previous paper and similar to the current
paper, Burness (1976) considers the effect of resource
taxation on production, assuming a lifetime of reserves as
an endogenous variable in order to show how taxation of
oil affects this variable. For this reason, the author uses a
dynamic optimization method. Similar to Conrad and
Hool (1984), Burness (1976) considers tax rates that
vary over time.
The variable – the available reserves – is an exogenous
variable, and thus, cannot demonstrate the effect of taxes
on oil exploration. However Heaps and Helliwell (1985)
develop a model where exploration is an endogenous var-
iable. Heaps and Helliwell (1985) predict that taxation af-
fects not only the choice of extraction rates but also the
amount of resources employed to explore oil reserves. The
authors show the effect on reserves exploration through
the effect on the cost of exploration, assuming that “initial
reserves can be augmented by a certain exploration process
at a cost “C(R)” (Heaps & Helliwell, 1985, p. 452), which is
the present value of past exploration and development
expenses at the moment when the company starts the
extraction of reserves. The same assumption is used in the
current chapter to show the effect of taxes on oil explora-
tion. Heaps and Helliwell (1985) develop a proﬁt maximi-
zation problem for the producer of natural resources,
choosing the reserve’s lifetime and an extraction plan so as
tomaximize the present value of proﬁt. Themodel of Heaps
and Helliwell (1985) shows the effect of different types of
taxes, such as per unit taxes, net proﬁt taxes, a license fee,
property taxes, and resource rent taxes, on production
choice. They consider time-variable tax rates. The main
results of the analysis are that taxes affect the slope of the
extraction path, and if tax rates are variable over time, the
slope of the extraction path depends on whether the tax
rate increases at a rate greater or lesser than the discount
rate. The main limitation of this study is that it assumes a
ﬁxed oil price.More recent work on taxation includes Manzano’s
(2000) reviews of the Hotelling model. Hotelling’s study
(1931) is a pioneering work on the taxation of natural re-
sources. It provides a classical view on the subject. Similar
to Hotelling (1931), Manzano shows the effect of royalties
and income taxes on oil production and oil exploration. The
main ﬁndings of Manzano (2000) are that royalties and
income taxes cause a reduction in oil exploration and this
reduction depends on the shape of a development and
exploration cost of oil reserves.
All theoreticalmodels described above assume aﬁxed oil
price, an assumption, which needs reviewing in light of the
ﬂuctuating nature of oil prices at present. Also, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no theoretical model showing the
effect of price-dependent ad valorem taxes on oil produc-
tion and oil exploration assuming variable oil prices.
2.2. The effect of oil revenue funds on the economy
An oil revenue fund is a mechanism designed to reduce
the impact of resource revenue volatility on the economy
(Davis et al., 2001), but do oil revenue funds really helpwith
that? Davis et al. (2001) try to answer the question “how
effective are oil revenue funds?” in two parts: 1) what is the
effect of oil revenue funds on government expenditure?;
and 2) what is the effect of oil revenue funds on resource
export receipts? To answer these questions, Davis et al.
(2001) compare the effect of resource prices on govern-
ment expenditure and resource export receipts before and
after the countries created oil revenue funds using data of 12
countries with oil revenue funds (Chile, Kuwait, Norway,
Oman, Papua New Guinea, Algeria, Bahrain, Mexico, Saudi
Arabia, UAE, UK, and Venezuela) over the 34-year period
1965–1999. Their empirical estimation shows statistically
signiﬁcant negative correlation between government
expenditure and changes in oil prices. But the test shows no
statistically signiﬁcant effect of oil revenue funds on gov-
ernment expenditure and resource export receipts. These
empirical results, according toDavis et al. (2001), are limited
by data availability, quality, and the small sample size.
A similar test is performed by Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007),
who test whether oil revenue funds help reduce macro-
economic volatility using data of 15 countries heavily
reliant on the export of oil over the 30-year period 1973–
2003. Unlike Davis et al. (2001), who compares only those
countries with funds, Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) include
countries that have oil revenue funds, as well as six coun-
tries that do not have oil revenue funds. According to
Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007), the inclusion of countries that do
not have oil revenue funds helps to avoid heterogeneity
and, thus, biased results. This is because whether a country
created an oil revenue fund or not could be due to unob-
served characteristics.
Unlike the results of Davis et al. (2001), which show no
statistically signiﬁcant effect of oil revenue fund, the results
of Shabsigh and Ilahi’s (2007) econometric estimation show
that correlationbetween thepresence of anoil revenue fund
and broad money and CPI is statistically signiﬁcant and
negative, while correlation between the presence of oil
revenue funds and real effective exchange rates is negative
but not statistically signiﬁcant. Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007)
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prices. However, there is no statistical evidence that oil
revenue funds stabilize real effective exchange rates.3. Fiscal policy in Kazakhstan
After its independence from the Soviet Union,
Kazakhstan has become an important player in the world
energy market due to its signiﬁcant oil reserves. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the economy moved
into transition. During that transition and until now, sig-
niﬁcant ﬁscal reforms have been introduced such as taxa-
tion of oil and privatization of property and businesses.
By January 2009, nearly 160 deposits of oil and gas with
oil reserves worth 30 billion barrels were discoveredwithin
Kazakhstan’s territory (the Energy Information Adminis-
tration). The development of Kazakhstan’s oil sector has
beenmainly through foreign direct investments in the form
of sharing agreements.
As of 2008, Kazakhstan’s production capacity is 1.49
million barrels daily, and its reﬁning capability is 345,000
thousand barrels daily (the Energy Information Adminis-
tration). Most oil producers in Kazakhstan export crude oil
and are not keen to produce reﬁned oil locally. Fig. 2
compares oil production, world oil prices and domestic
consumption from 1991 to 2008. It shows that the export of
Kazakhstan’s crude oil might have a positive relationship
with world oil prices – it follows the increasing trend of
world oil prices. Domestic consumption (oil production less
oil exports), meanwhile, decreased contrary to the
increasing behavior of oil prices from 1991 to 2008.
Among the oil producers, Kazmunaigaz is the only oil
company that is wholly-owned by Kazakhstan – the rest
are largely foreign-owned companies. The major players
include: Chevron, Agip, Eni, Exxon Mobil, Petrokazakhstan,
ConocoPhillips, Royal Dutch Shell, Tasbulat Oil, Total,
British Gas, LukAcro, Lukoil.
Apart of usual taxes oil producers have to pay oil taxes.
The main objective of oil taxation is to receive a share of oil
since oil belongs to the country. The government of
Kazakhstan has imposed the following taxes on oil com-
panies from January 1, 2009 (The Ministry of Finance of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2009):
 tax on the export of crude oil is a price-dependent ad
valorem tax based on the value of oil exported with tax
rates from 0 to 32 percent (depending on the oil price);
 excess proﬁt tax is a progressive tax with tax rates from
10 to 60 percent, depending on the ratio of income and
cost;
 special payments from subsurface users1;1 Subsurface users pay taxes according to their signed contracts. A
contract states the tax regime for the subsurface user, which can either be
excess proﬁt tax regime or production sharing agreement regime. With
excess proﬁt tax regime companies are not eligible to pay a production
share to Kazakhstan, but pay all other taxes. With a production sharing
agreement companies pay a production share to Kazakhstan and not
liable to pay tax on export of crude oil, royalties, excise tax on crude oil,
excess proﬁt tax, land tax, tax on property. bonuses are payments made by subsurface users for the
right to use the subsurface in the Republic of
Kazakhstan, which can be a ﬁxed lump sum or at the
rate of 0.1 percent of the estimated value of proven
extractable resources every time a commercial discov-
ery of mineral resources in Kazakhstan is made;
 royalties tax is a quantity-dependent ad valorem tax
based on the value of oil produced with rates from 7 to
20 percent (depending on the amount of oil produced)
and can be paid either in cash or in oil;
 production share of Kazakhstan is deﬁned as the total
value of proﬁt less the production share of subsurface
users. The production share of subsurface users is
determined as the lesser of the percentage values ob-
tained from the following three triggers:
1. proﬁtability indicator – the ratio of the cumulative
income of a subsurface user to cumulative project
expenses,
2. the internal rate of return of a contractor – the
discount rate at which the real net present value
reaches zero,
3. price coefﬁcient – the ratio of subsurface user’s
income to the volume of production;
 taxation of business proﬁt, such as corporate income tax
and branch proﬁts tax;
 indirect taxation such as value-added tax, excise and
customs duties;
 other taxes such as environmental fees, property tax,
land tax, vehicle tax, and other fees and licenses.
Before 2004, most taxes on oil were set by contracts
with oil producers and not by the tax law (The Ministry of
Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2001; The Ministry
of State Income of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1991, 1995).
From 2004 on, all taxes on oil were set by the tax law (The
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2004).
Also in 2004, a tax on oil exports was introduced. This tax
discriminates oil sold in the world oil market, as compared
to oil sold in the domestic market. Creating oil export taxes
by lowering the oil price in the domestic market reduces
government revenue from other taxes that are based on the
revenue from the domestic oil market. According to
Boadway and Flatters (1993), the use of an export tax rather
than the equivalent royalties tax on all sales, export and
domestic, leads to a reduction of government revenues.
This loss, they add, is proportional to the tax rate and the
elasticity of the domestic oil market. The above argument
against an export tax can be limited if a country exporting
oil has monopoly power in the world market. The main
reason for the government of Kazakhstan to impose a tax
on oil exports rather than the equivalent royalties tax is to
promote the development of oil reﬁning industries. Export
taxes on oil give domestic reﬁning companies the advan-
tage (on top of the transport cost advantage) of access to oil
at prices lower than the competitive world price.
The recent changes in oil taxation were introduced by
the tax law in 2009 (TheMinistry of Finance of the Republic
of Kazakhstan, 2009). From 2009 royalties tax rates set at a
different scale (depending on the amount of oil produced)
and at greater tax rates. The scale of taxation on oil exports
was changed signiﬁcantly. Before 2009, tax rates set for oil
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Fig. 2. Kazakhstan’s oil production, export and world oil prices. Data source: The Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.
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zero tax rate for oil exported at prices below 19 US dollars
per barrel. From 2009 the tax on oil exports were set at an
increasing rate for oil exported at prices from 40 to 200 US
dollars per barrel with a zero tax rate on oil exported at
prices below 40 US dollars per barrel. Taking into account a
signiﬁcant fall in oil prices up to 40–50US dollars per barrel,
the tax on oil exports must be paid at a rate of zero or seven
percent, which are signiﬁcantly lower than before 2009 for
the same price (33 percent). These changes in 2009 in the
taxonoil exports didnot allow for taxation of oil exports at a
greater rate for higher oil prices, but only tax oil exports at a
lower rate for lowoil prices in 2009. It is very difﬁcult toﬁnd
an optimal scale for price-dependent taxes due to the large
variation of oil prices. The data for oil prices from 1861 to
2007 (Fig. 3) shows that oil prices can be as low as 10 US
dollars per barrel and as high as 100 US dollars per barrel.
In order to secure oil revenue during periods of low oil
prices, the government can set a per unit tax, allowing a
certain level of revenue even when oil prices are very low,
while an ad valorem tax allows to achieve higher revenue
during high oil prices. A combination of different types of
taxes can help to reduce volatility in oil revenue due to high
variability in oil prices.
In order to manage oil revenue more effectively, the
government of Kazakhstan created the National Fund of the
Republic of Kazakhstan (the National fund) in 2000 (The
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2000). However
the ﬁrst deposit of 660 million US dollars was made in
January 2001. We assume that the National fund started to
work in January 2001. The general objectives of the Na-
tional fund are to stabilize the economy and achieve inter-
generational redistribution. The following payments must
be deposited in the National Fund according to the
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2001, 2005, 2010):
corporate income tax, excess proﬁt tax and rent tax on oil
and gas exports, bonuses, royalties, production share,
additional payments according to production sharing
agreements, ﬁnes and penalties (excluding ﬁnes and pen-
alties which form local budgets) paid by selected petroleum
sector corporations, proceeds from the privatization of
state property in the mining and manufacturing sectors,proceeds from sales of agricultural land and investment
income of the Fund. Other income that is not prohibited by
law of the Republic of Kazakhstan can also accumulate the
fund. The list of petroleum sector corporations which
payments accumulate the fund is set by the government.
From 2001 till June 2006 petroleum sector corporations
which payments accumulate the National fund were set for
every tax which must be deposited in the National fund
(the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2001).
These lists were changed several times (decreased). From
July 2006 the single list of petroleum sector corporations
was set for all taxes (the Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, 2006) and was signiﬁcantly expanded (from
8 to 55). From 2009 the list of petroleum sector corpora-
tions must be set for every year (The Republic of
Kazakhstan, 2008) and was signiﬁcantly expanded from
55 to 152. Till June 2006 not all payments listed above
accumulated the National fund, but only payments above
planed by the government (The President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, 2001). Planned payments were calculated
using the budgeted (reference) oil price at 19 US dollars per
barrel (The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2005).
From July 2006 all payments listed above made by selected
petroleum sector corporations must be deposited in the
National fund according to the Code of the Republic of
Kazakhstan (2004) with changes in article 23 according
to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2006) and Budget
Code of the Republic of the Kazakhstan (2008). The asset-
split of the National fund is 100 percent foreign. Domestic
investments by the National fund are not allowed. This is
done in order to protect exchange rate of local currency,
tenge. Kazakhstan receives oil revenue in foreign currency.
Thesewindfalls of foreign currency can affect exchange rate
of tenge. By investing in foreign assets windfalls of foreign
currency is taken abroad and brought back to Kazakhstan
slowly. By May 1, 2009, the fund had accumulated some 22
billion US dollars (The National Bank of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, 2008), or roughly 17 percent of the country’s
GDP during the period from January 2001 to May 1, 2009.
Around 19.5 million US dollars (The National Bank of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, 2008), or 90 percent of the Na-
tional fund, are gross international reserves.
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every year. From the time of the creation of the National
fund, the major revenue was non-tax (sales of property and
agricultural lands), but every year the tax-revenue share is
becoming a larger portion of the total revenue of the Na-
tional fund (Fig. 4).
Davis et al. (2001) suggest measuring the effectiveness of
the oil revenue fund by its effect on the relationship between
the government expenditure and resource export earnings.
The data shows a possible positive correlation between
Kazakhstan’s government expenditure and export of oil
(Fig. 5).Also, the correlation looks strongerbefore2001,while
from 2001 on (after creation of the National fund), govern-
ment expenditure looks less correlated with oil exports.
Nevertheless, there is a strong relationship between the
government’s revenue and expenditure with oil prices
(Fig. 6).
Kazakhstan’s proven reserves of oil are about 30 billion
barrels (The Energy Information Administration), which is
projected to sustain the current production level of 1400
barrels daily for more than 59 years.
An economy’s dependency on oil resources can be
measured in two ways (Liuksila, Garcia, & Bassett, 1994):0
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exports to obtain foreign exchange (the share of oil export
to total export), while ﬁscal dependency on the other hand,
measures how the public sector relies on oil revenues (the
share of oil taxes to total ﬁscal revenue). Data which is
necessary to calculate external dependency of Kazakhstan
is available, but oil revenue of Kazakhstan, which is needed
to calculate ﬁscal dependency, is not available. That is why
payments of oil and gas companies to the government of
Kazakhstan from National Reports on the implementation
of the extractive industry transparency initiative in
Kazakhstan 2005–2011 (available at www.eiti.org) were
used as approximate data. These reports provide payments
of selected oil, gas and mining companies. During the
period 2005–2008 payments by oil and gas companies are
not separated from payments by mining companies. From
2009 only tax payments to the budget from the oil and gas
companies (excluding mining companies) were used. Since
in 2005 only payments of 38 oil, gas and mining companies
available, while in 2006–2011 payments of 103–170 oil, gas
and mining companies are available, we calculated ﬁscal
dependency over the period 2006–2011. Oil revenue is
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sum of government revenue and payments of oil com-
panies which were deposited into the National fund.
Employing these measurements and plotting the share of
Kazakhstan’s oil exports to its total exports against the
share of oil revenue to total revenue shows that Kazakhstan
has a high external oil dependency (Fig. 7). About 70
percent of export earning and 40 percent of the ﬁscal rev-
enue can be deﬁnitively associated with the economic ac-
tivities of the oil sector. For comparison, Fig. 8, based on the
work of Liuksila et al. (1994) shows that Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela, which are also oil-dependent
countries, have over 60 percent external and ﬁscal de-
pendency (Fig. 8).
As is the case for most oil-producing countries,
Kazakhstan has beneﬁted from the upward trend in oil0
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gov; and The State Budget of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Finance oprices that is largely attributable to the strong demand for
energy products over the past few years. A simple test of
correlation depicted in the graph below afﬁrms the positive
correlation between Kazakhstan’s GDP and the world oil
price and between Kazakhstan’s GDP and the country’s oil
production (Figs. 9 and 10).
The portion of fund’s revenue in Kazakhstan’s total
revenue is constantly increasing (Fig. 11).
4. Theoretical analysis
In this section we use a theoretical model to show the
effect of different taxes on oil production and exploration
when oil prices vary. Knowing the effect of taxation on oil
production, it is straightforward to estimate the revenue of
the National fund.0
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Oil is an exhaustible and a nonrenewable resource. Its
production follows these stages: exploration of oil reserves,
development of oil reserves, extraction of oil and process-
ing of oil. The exploration of oil involves risks associated
with uncertainty of the size of the reserves that will be
discovered and the future volatility of oil prices.
According to Heaps and Helliwell (1985), an oil producer
chooses the reserve’s lifetime, T, an amount of extracted oil,
q, and reserves, R, that maximize the present value of
proﬁts across the lifetime of the reserves, V, given by the
formula:
max
R;q;T
V ¼
Z T
0
p qð Þert dt  C Rð Þ (1)
subject to transition equation dRðtÞ=dt ¼ qðtÞ, initial oil
reserves equation R(0) ¼ R and the transversality condition
equation R(T)¼ 0, where p is the proﬁt of the oil company, r
is the discount rate, C(R) is the cost of oil exploration and R
is the discovered oil reserves.Egypt
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Fig. 8. Oil dependency of selected oil-producing countries. Data sources: For all cou
The Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov; Statistical B
minﬁn.kz; and The State Budget of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.mThe transversality equation means that the entire oil
reserves must be extracted. Otherwise the oil producer can
increase the present value of proﬁt by extending the
extraction period. This problem can be solved by con-
structing the present value Hamiltonian function
(Pontryagin, 1934) for a proﬁt maximizing oil-producing
company:
H ¼ ert p½qðtÞ  CðRÞ þ lðtÞ½qðtÞ; (2)
where l is the present-value shadow price of the reserves,
which represents the present value (discounted to time
zero) of the stream of future proﬁts of an increment of
reserves at time t, it is also called costate variable. Here
control variable is an amount of oil extracted (it is also
called a choice variable) and state variable is oil reserves.
The necessary conditions for an optimum can be
expressed as follows:
vpðqÞ
vqðtÞe
rt  lðtÞ ¼ 0: (3)Venezuela
SaudiArabia
Nigeria
Kazakhstan
80 100
 in total export, %
ntries except Kazakhstan, data source is Liuksila et al., 1994. For Kazakhstan:
ulletin, Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.
inﬁn.kz.
Fig. 9. Kazakhstan’s GDP and world oil prices. Data sources: The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.nationalbank.kz; and the Energy
Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.
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should be the same at all points in time:
C0ðRÞ ¼ vlðtÞ
vðtÞ : (4)
This equation means that the present-value shadow
price of additionally explored reserves must be equal to the
marginal cost of oil exploration.
Transversality condition requires that:
lðTÞRðTÞ ¼ 0: (5)
If Hamiltonian function, H, is concave in R, then the
conditions above are sufﬁcient for a maximum. The solu-
tion of necessary conditions (equations (3)–(5)) implies
that:
v2p
vq2
dq
dt
¼ r vp
vq
 v
2p
vqvt
; (6)0
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Fig. 10. Kazakhstan’s GDP and oil production. Data sources: The National Bank of th
Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.where dq=dt is the slope of the extraction path and equals
to:
dq
dt
¼ r vp=vq
v2p

vq2
 v
2p
ðvqvtÞ
v2p

vq2
: (7)
It is assumed that the proﬁt function is concave in q, so
that v2p=vq2 < 0. Heaps and Helliwell (1985) predict that
v2p=vqvt is small if the oil price is not rising too fast. In this
case the slope of the extraction path ðdq=dtÞ is negative,
and thus, decreases over time. If ðv2p=vqvtÞ is large enough,
if the oil price is rising fast enough, the slope of the
extraction path is positive, thus, the extraction rate
increases over time.
The solution of the Hamiltonian function is:
vp
vq
erT  C0ðRÞ ¼ 0: (8)20
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Fig. 11. The National fund’s revenue and the government revenue. Data source: The State Budget of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Finance of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.minﬁn.kz.
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Oil companies are eligible to pay different types of
taxes: ad valorem, per unit and lump sum taxes. Tax rates
can be ﬁxed or vary with oil price or an amount of oil
produced. There is plenty of literature showing the effect of
different taxes on oil production assuming non-variable oil
prices and non-variable tax rates. As a contribution to
existing literature, the following sections show the effect of
price-dependent and quantity-dependent ad valorem taxes
assuming variable oil prices. In Kazakhstan, two taxes on oil
are set at variable tax rates: royalties which rates vary with
an amount of oil produced and export tax which rates vary
with the oil price. In Section 4.2.1, a baseline model with
non-variable tax rate and non-variable oil prices is shown.
In the following sections, these assumptions are relaxed. In
Section 4.2.2, we developed a model with non-variable tax
rate but with variable oil prices; this is the case of value-
added tax in Kazakhstan. In Section 4.2.3, the model is
developed to show the effect of a tax on oil that varies with
prices on oil production and oil exploration with variable
oil prices; this is the case of tax on oil exports in
Kazakhstan. In Section 4.2.4, the model is developed to
show the effect of a tax that varies with quantity on oil
production and oil exploration; this is the case of royalties
tax in Kazakhstan.
4.2.1. The effect of ad valorem taxes
The equation below shows the problem of proﬁt maxi-
mizing when an oil producer is eligible to pay tax as a
portion of oil revenue, assuming that prices and the tax rate
is ﬁxed:
max
R;q;T
V ¼
Z T
0
ps q tð Þð Þert dt  C Rð Þ (9)
subject to transition equation dRðtÞ=dt ¼ qðtÞ,initial oil
reserves equation R(0) ¼ R and transversality condition
equation R(T) ¼ 0, where ps is the proﬁt of an oil company
after tax. It is assumed that the oil company is eligible to
pay tax as a portion of oil revenue, thus:p ðqðtÞ; pÞ ¼ pðqðtÞ; pÞ  qðtÞps; (10)s
where s is a rate of ad valorem tax and p is an oil price. This
problem can be solved by constructing the present-value
Hamiltonian function for a proﬁt maximizing oil-
producing company:
H ¼ ertðpðqðtÞ; pÞ  qðtÞpsÞ  CðRÞ þ lðtÞ½qðtÞ: (11)
The necessary conditions for an optimum can be
expressed as follows:

vp
vq
 sp

ert ¼ lðtÞ; (12)
C0ðRÞ ¼ vlðtÞ
vt
; (13)
and
lðTÞRðTÞ ¼ 0: (14)
If H is concave in R, then the conditions above Eqs. (12)–
(14) are sufﬁcient for amaximum. The solution of necessary
conditions (12)–(14) implies that:
v2p
vq2
dq
dt
¼ r vp
vq
 v
2p
vqvt
 rps; (15)
where dq=dt is the slope of the extraction path and equals
to:
dq
dt
¼ r vp=vq
v2p

vq2
 v
2p
ðvqvtÞ
v2p

vq2
 rps 1
v2p

vq2
: (16)
As in Section 4.1, it is assumed that the proﬁt function is
concave in q, so that v2p=vq2 < 0. As explained in
Section 4.1, v2p=vqvt can be small or large. If v2p=vqvt is
small, the slope of the extraction path is negative. If
v2p=vqvt is large enough, the slope of the extraction path is
positive. The last term on the right-hand side is the only
difference between the slope of the extraction path with a
tax and without a tax. The tax makes the slope of the
extraction path less negative, and, thus, ﬂatter. The size of
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depends on the slope of the proﬁt function and the oil price.
The solution of necessary conditions (12)–(14) of the
Hamiltonian function implies:
vp
vq
erT  C0ðRÞ ¼ ps erT : (17)
The only difference with the no tax equation (8) is the
right-hand side ps erT . If the tax increases at T, it cannot at
the same time raise reserve R (assuming a rising marginal
exploration cost). A higher extraction path is not optimal,
instead a lower extraction path is optimal. Thus, ad valorem
tax on oil revenue reduces efforts to explore reserves and
reduces the extraction of oil.
4.2.2. The effect of ad valorem taxes with variable oil prices
In Kazakhstan, value-added tax is set at a non-variable
tax rate as a portion of the value of oil sold on domestic
market. When the oil producer is eligible to pay tax as a
portion of oil revenue, assuming that the tax rate does not
vary over time (value-added tax) and oil prices vary, it faces
the same proﬁt maximizing problem as in equation (9).
Assuming that the oil company is eligible to pay tax as a
portion of revenue from oil sold on domestic market, the
proﬁt of oil producer after tax as following:
psðqðtÞ; pðtÞÞ ¼ pðqðtÞ; pðtÞÞ  qðtÞ
d
pðtÞs; (18)
where d is a portion of oil sold in domestic market. This
problem can be solved by constructing the present-value
Hamiltonian function for a proﬁt maximizing oil-
producing company when oil prices are variable:
H ¼ ert

pðqðtÞ;pðtÞÞspðtÞqðtÞ
d

CðRÞþlðtÞðqðtÞÞ (19)
subject to transition equation dRðtÞ=dt ¼qðtÞ, initial oil
reserves equation R(0) ¼ R and transversality condition
R(T) ¼ 0.
The necessary conditions for an optimum can be
expressed as follows:

vp
vq
 sp
d

ert ¼ lðtÞ; (20)
C0ðRÞ ¼ vlðtÞ
vt
; (21)
and
lðTÞRðTÞ ¼ 0: (22)
If H is concave in R, then the conditions above are suf-
ﬁcient for a maximum. The solution of the necessary con-
ditions (20)–(22), assuming a ﬁxed tax rate and a variable
oil price p(t), implies the following equation:
v2p
vq2
dq
dt
¼ r vp
vq
 v
2p
vqvt
þ

dp
dt
 rp

s
d
 v
2p
vqvp
dp
dt
; (23)where dq=dt is a slope of the extraction path and
equals to:
dq
dt
¼ r vp=vq
v2p

vq2
v
2p
ðvqvtÞ
v2p

vq2
þ

dp
dt
 rp

s
d
1
v2p

vq2


v2p
ðvqvpÞðdp=dtÞ
v2p

vq2
: (24)
As in Section 4.1, it is assumed that the proﬁt function is
concave in q, so that v2p=vq2 < 0. As explained in Section
4.1, v2p=vqvt can be small or large. If v2p=vqvt is small, the
slope of the extraction path is negative. If v2p=vqvt is large
enough, the slope of the extraction path is positive. The
only difference with the slope of the no-tax extraction path
(equation (7)) is the last two terms of the right-hand side of
the equation. How the third term affects the slope of the
extraction path depends on its sign. If ðdp=dt  rpÞ < 0, the
oil price increases at a greater rate than the interest, the
slope of the extraction path is less negative, and, thus,
ﬂatter than the no-tax extraction path. If ðdp=dt  rpÞ > 0,
the oil price increases at a rate less than the interest, this
makes the slope of extraction pathmore negative and, thus,
steeper than the no-tax extraction path. According to Heaps
and Helliwell (1985), if ðdp=dt  rpÞ ¼ 0, the oil price in-
creases at the same rate as interest; however, it does not
mean that the above equation takes the same form as in the
case of no tax. Instead the extraction path with tax differs
from the no-tax extraction path. This is because the
following equation, which is the solution of the necessary
conditions (equations (20)–(22)) of the Hamiltonian func-
tion, requires:
vp
vq
erT  C0ðRÞ ¼ ps
d
erT : (25)
So a different extraction path satisfying equation (25)
will be used. Thus, when the oil price rises at the same
rate or below the rate of interest, the optimal extraction
path is lower than the no-tax extraction path. This is
because if tax increases at T, it cannot at the same time raise
the reserve R (assuming rising marginal exploration cost).
Oil production will be reduced and fewer reserves will be
discovered, although the degree of the negative effect de-
pends on the tax rate and the portion of oil sold in the
domestic market in total oil production. If the portion of oil
sold domestically equals zero, all produced oil is exported,
leading to a zero effect on oil extraction and oil exploration
from the value-added tax. If the portion of oil sold
domestically equals one, all oil is sold on the domestic
market and the effect of the value-added tax is similar to
royalties.
4.2.3. The effect of price-dependent ad valorem taxes with
variable oil prices
In Kazakhstan, the tax on oil exports is set at tax rates
that vary with oil prices: a higher tax rate is set for a higher
oil price. An export tax is similar to royalties, the only dif-
ference being that the former applies to exported oil and
not on oil consumed domestically.
When an oil producer is eligible to pay an oil export tax
as a portion of revenue from oil exports, assuming that tax
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faces the proﬁt maximizing problem same as in equation
(9). Assuming that an oil company is required to pay tax on
exported oil as a portion of revenue from exported oil with
oil prices variable over time and the tax rate varying with
the oil price, the proﬁt of an oil producer after tax as
following:
psðqðtÞ; pÞ ¼ pðqðtÞ; pðtÞÞ  qðtÞ
x
pðtÞsðpðtÞÞ; (26)
where x is a portion of exported oil and s(p(t)) is a rate of a
price-dependent ad valorem tax on oil exports. Here it is
assumed that s is not ﬁxed and depends on the oil price,
thus: s(p(t)). This problem can be solved by constructing
the present-value Hamiltonian function for a proﬁt maxi-
mizing oil-producing company:
H ¼ ert

pðqðtÞ; pðtÞÞ  sðpðtÞÞpðtÞ qðtÞ
x

 CðRÞ
þ lðtÞðqðtÞÞ (27)
subject to transition equation dRðtÞ=dt ¼ qðtÞ, initial oil
reserves equation R(0) ¼ R and transversality condition
equation R(T) ¼ 0.
The necessary conditions for an optimum can be
expressed as follows:

vp
vq
 sp
x

ert ¼ lðtÞ; (28)
C0ðRÞ ¼ vlðtÞ
vt
; (29)
and
lðTÞRðTÞ ¼ 0: (30)
If H is concave in R, the conditions above are sufﬁcient
for a maximum. The solution of necessary conditions (28)–
(30) implies that:
v2p
vq2
dq
dt
¼ r vp
vq
 v
2p
vqvt
þ

dp
dt
 rp

s
x
þ ds
dp
dp
dt
p
 v
2p
vqvp
dp
dt
; (31)
where dq=dt is a slope of the extraction path and is equal
to:
dq
dt
¼ r vp=vq
v2p

vq2
 v
2p
ðvqvtÞ
v2p

vq2
þ

dp
dt
 rp

s
x
1
v2p

vq2
þ
ds
dp
dp
dt
v2p

vq2
p

v2p
ðvqvpÞðdp=dtÞ
v2p

vq2
:
(32)
As in Section 4.1, it is assumed that the proﬁt function is
concave in q, so that v2p=vq2 < 0. As explained in Section 4.1,
v2p=vqvt can be small or large. If v2p=vqvt is small, the slope
of theextractionpath is negative. If v2p=vqvt is large enough,
the slope of the extraction path is positive. The main dif-
ference between the slope of the extraction path with aprice-dependent ad valorem tax (equation (32)) and the
extraction path with ad valorem tax (equation (24)) is the
fourth term of the right-hand of equation (32). A price-
dependent ad valorem tax on oil exports is set at a higher
rate for a higher price; thus, the oil price has a positive effect
on tax rate, or ds=dp > 0. Therefore, the sign of the third
term depends on the sign of dp=dt. An increase in oil prices
makes the extractionpath steeperwhile a decrease in the oil
price makes the extraction path ﬂatter. The only difference
with the slope of the no-tax extraction path (equation (7)) is
the last three terms of the right-hand side of the equation.
The effect of the third term on slope of the extraction path is
the same as described in Section 4.2.2. Similar to Section
4.2.2, even if ðdp=dt  rpÞ ¼ 0, the oil price increases at the
same rate as the interest, and the tax rate does not varywith
the oil price; however it does not mean that the above
equation takes the same form as in the case of no-tax. The
extraction path with export tax differs from the no-tax
extraction path. This is because the following equation,
which is the solution of the ﬁrst order conditions (equations
(28)–(30)) of the Hamiltonian function, requires:
vp
vq
erT  C0ðRÞ ¼ ps
x
erT : (33)
So a different extraction path satisfying equation (33) is
used. Thus, when the oil price rises at the same rate or
below the rate of interest and when the tax rate increases
over time, the extraction path is lower than the no-tax
extraction path. The reason for that is the same as
described in Section 4.2.2: if tax increases at T, it cannot at
the same time raise the reserve R (assuming risingmarginal
exploration cost). Oil production will be reduced and fewer
reserves will be discovered, although the degree of the
negative effect depends on the tax rate. An increase in the
oil price also has some negative effect on oil production and
oil exploration because the tax rate increases with oil price.
The effect is lower if the tax rate increases at a lower rate
than the oil price. The size of the effect of the tax on the
slope of extraction path depends now also on the portion of
oil exports in total production. If the portion of oil exports
equals zero, all produced oil is consumed domestically, so
the export tax has no effect on oil extraction and oil
exploration. If the portion of oil exports equals one, all
produced oil is exported, and the effect of tax is the same as
the effect of a royalties tax (assuming royalties are set at a
price-dependent rate).
4.2.4. The effect of quantity-dependent ad valorem taxes with
variable oil prices
In Kazakhstan, the royalties tax is set at a rate that varies
with the amount of oil produced: a higher tax rate is set for
a greater amount of oil produced. When an oil producer is
eligible to pay a quantity-dependent ad valorem tax, which
rates vary with the amount of oil produced, and oil prices
vary over time, it faces the proﬁt maximizing problem same
as in equation (9).
It is assumed that an oil company is required to pay a
quantity-dependent ad valorem tax and with oil prices
variable over time, thus the proﬁt of an oil producer after
tax as following:
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tax. This problem can be solved by constructing the
present-value Hamiltonian function for a proﬁt maximizing
oil-producing company:
H ¼ ert ½pðqðtÞ; pðtÞÞ  sðqðtÞÞpðtÞqðtÞ  CðRÞ
þ lðtÞðqðtÞÞ (35)
subject to transition equation dRðtÞ=dt ¼ qðtÞ, initial oil
reserves equation R(0) ¼ R and transversality condition
R(T) ¼ 0.
The necessary conditions for an optimum can be
expressed as follows:

vp
vq
 vs
vq
pq sp

ert ¼ lðtÞ; (36)
C0ðRÞ ¼ vlðtÞ
vt
; (37)
and
lðTÞRðTÞ ¼ 0: (38)
If H is concave in R, then the conditions above are suf-
ﬁcient for amaximum. The solution of necessary conditions
(36)–(38) implies that:
v2p
vq2
dq
dt
¼ r vp
vq
 v
2p
vqvt
þ

dp
dt
 rp

sþ ds
dq
dq
dt
p v
2p
vqvp
dp
dt
;
(39)
where dq=dt is a slope of the extraction path and equals
to:
dq
dt
¼ r vp=vq
v2p

vq2
 v
2p
ðvqvtÞ
v2p

vq2
þ

dp
dt
 rp

s
1
v2p

vq2
þ
ds
dq
dq
dt
v2p

vq2
p

v2p
ðvqvpÞðdp=dtÞ
v2p

vq2
(40)
As in Section 4.1, it is assumed that the proﬁt function
is concave in q, so that v2p=vq2 < 0. As explained inTable 1
Data.
Data and units Period
CPI, index (December 1993 ¼ 100) Jan. 1994–Jul. 2013
GIR, US dollars Jan. 1994–Jul. 2013
REER, index (December 2000 ¼ 100) Jan. 1995–Jun. 2013
Exchange rate, tenge/US dollar Jan. 2005–Jul. 2013
Fund’s assets, US dollars Jan. 2001–Jul. 2013
Fund’s revenue, tenge Jan. 2005–Jul. 2013
Fund’s withdrawals, tenge Jan. 2005–Jul. 2013
Government expenditure, tenge Jan. 1999–Jun. 2013
Oil production, thousand barrels/day Jan. 1994–Apr. 2013
CPI of USA, index (December 2005 ¼ 100) Jan. 1994–Jun. 2013
World oil price, US dollars/barrel Jan. 1994–Jul. 2013Section 4.1, v2p=vqvt can be small or large. If v2p=vqvt is
small, the slope of the extraction path is negative. If
v2p=vqvt is large enough, the slope of the extraction path
is positive. The main difference between the slope of the
extraction path with a quantity-dependent ad valorem tax
(equation (40)) and the extraction path with an ad val-
orem tax (equation (24)) is the fourth term of the right-
hand side. A quantity-dependent ad valorem tax is set at
a higher rate for a greater amount of oil produced; thus,
the amount of oil produced has a positive effect on tax
rate, or ds=dq > 0. Thus, the sign of the third term de-
pends on the sign of dq=dt. An increase in oil production
makes the extraction path steeper and a decrease in oil
production makes the extraction path ﬂatter. The only
difference with the slope of the no-tax extraction path
(equation (7)) is the last three terms of the right-hand
side of the equation. The effect of the third term on the
slope of the extraction path is the same as described in
Section 4.2.2. Similar to Section 4.2.2, even if
ðdp=dt  rpÞ ¼ 0, the oil price increases at the same rate
as interest, and tax rate does not vary with quantity, it
does not mean that the above equation takes the same
form as in the case of no tax and the extraction path with
tax differs from the no-tax extraction path. This is because
the following equation, which is the solution of the ﬁrst
order conditions (equations (36)–(38)) of the Hamiltonian
function, requires:
vp
vq
erT  C0ðRÞ ¼

vs
vq
pqþ ps

erT : (41)
So a different extraction path satisfying equation (41)
will be used. Thus, when oil prices raise at the same rate
or below the rate of interest, and when the tax rate in-
creases over time, the extraction path is lower than the no-
tax extraction path. The reason for that is the same as
described in Section 4.2.2; if the tax increases at T, it cannot
at the same time raise reserves (R) (assuming rising mar-
ginal exploration cost). Oil production will be reduced and
fewer reserves will be discovered, although the degree of
the negative effect depends on the tax rate. The negative
effect of tax is lower if the tax rate increases at a lower rate
than the amount of oil produced.Source
National Bank of Kazakhstan (www.nationalbank.kz)
National Bank of Kazakhstan (www.nationalbank.kz)
National Bank of Kazakhstan (www.nationalbank.kz)
National Bank of Kazakhstan (www.nationalbank.kz)
National Bank of Kazakhstan (www.nationalbank.kz)
Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan, Statement of receipts
and application of the National fund of the Republic of
Kazakhstan (www.minﬁn.gov.kz)
Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan, Statement of receipts
and application of the National fund of the Republic of
Kazakhstan (www.minﬁn.gov.kz)
Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan, Statistical bulletin
(www.minﬁn.gov.kz)
US EIA, IES (www.eia.gov)
IMF, IFS (www.imf.org)
IMF, IFS (www.imf.org)
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Number of observations Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Oil production, thousand barrels/day 232 1010 419 407 1621
Real world oil price, US dollars/barrel 234 47 27 12 119
Real government expenditure, mln. tenge 174 219,975 173,004 16,430 83,916
Fund’s revenue, mln. US dollars 235 358 515 109 2563
Real GIR, mln. US dollars 224 10,844 9730 1252 32,363
REER, index December 2000 ¼ 100 222 102 10 86 135
VAT, % 235 15 2 12 20
Export tax, % 235 12 14 0 33
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The current section tests the effect of ﬁscal policy on oil
production, the National fund’s revenue, gross interna-
tional reserves and the effectiveness of the National fund.
Effectiveness in this context means whether the National
fund helps to stabilize government expenditure and REER.
5.1. Data
Data sources are provided in Table 1. All data are
monthly. The summary statistics are provided in Table 2.
Since oil export is available only from January 2001, we
used oil production data instead. The monthly real value of
oil production was calculated by multiplying real world oil
price in US dollars per barrel on oil production in thousand
barrels per day. We used world oil prices as approximate
price for oil which was produced in Kazakhstan. Real oil
prices were computed by dividing the nominal price in a
given month by the ratio of the CPI of USA in that month to
the CPI of USA in the “base”period, December 2005. The real
government expenditure was computed by dividing the
governmentexpenditure in a givenmonthby the ratioof the
CPI of Kazakhstan in that month to the CPI of Kazakhstan in
the “base” period, December 2005. The similar way were
calculated real gross international reserves. It is necessary to
dropCPI of Kazakhstan data beforeNovember 1994 (Fig.12),
fromNovember 1994 price liberalization in Kazakhstanwas
complete according to Hoen (2010).
In the samemonth a part of oil revenue can be deposited
in the National fund and a part of the National fund’s assets10
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Fig. 12. Consumer price index. Data sources: The National Bank of twithdrawn to the budget for government expenditure. That
is why we have to take into account not only the revenue of
the National fund but alsowithdrawals. This can be done by
calculating net revenue of the National fund as a difference
between revenue and withdrawals to the budget. Revenue
of the National fund is not only oil revenue received from
oil producers, but also investment earnings. It is necessary
to deduct investment earnings from total revenue of the
National fund. Withdrawals from the National fund are
allowed to cover budget deﬁcit, transfers to the budget and
to cover the cost on external auditing of the National fund.
It is important to deduct the expenditure of external
auditing from total withdrawals as it is not government
expenditure. Data on deposits and withdrawals of the Na-
tional fund are provided by the Ministry of Finance of the
Republic of Kazakhstan only from 2005 (ﬁve years after the
fund was established). However the central bank of the
Republic of Kazakhstan provides the value of accumulated
assets of the National fund at the end of every month
starting from 2001. The revenue of the National fund for the
period over 2001–2004 was calculated approximately as
the difference in the value of ﬁnancial assets of the National
fund at the end of every month. The difference between
differences of the value of assets of the National fund and
actual accumulation of the National fund are cost of
external auditing and investment earnings of the National
fund. Cost of external auditing of the National fund is
approximately 0.2 percent per year of the annual difference
of the value of assets, while annual investment earnings are
approximately ten percent of the annual difference in the
value of assets of the National fund (using data of 2011).m1 2010m1 2015m1
he Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.nationalbank.kz.
Table 3
Dummy variables.
Dummy variable Period
Fund exists From January 2001
Fund 2001 January 2001–June 2006
Fund 2006 July 2006–December 2008
Fund 2009 From January 2009
Taxes 2004 January 2004–December 2008
Taxes 2009 From January 2009
Table 5
The results of Engle–Granger cointegration test.
Variables p
Lags
Breusch–Godfrey
test, chi-sq
DF/ADF
test
Result
The value of oil
production and oil price
2 0.001 2.809*** CI
GIR and the value of oil
production
0 1.086 3.081*** CI
REER and the value of oil
production
2 0.167 3.070*** CI
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
CI – cointegration.
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Ministry of Finance in tenge, while the value of assets in the
National fund is provided by the central bank in US dollars.
Fund’s deposits and withdrawals were converted into US
dollars using the ofﬁcial exchange rate of the central bank
of Kazakhstan. Net revenue of the National fund was
calculated as the difference between fund’s deposits and
fund’s withdrawals to the budget. The real net revenue of
the National fund was computed by dividing the net rev-
enue of the National fund in a given month by the ratio of
CPI of USA in that month to the CPI of USA in the “base”
period, December 2005.
Interestingly that the monthly data of the value of assets
in the National fund provided by the Ministry of Finance
and the central bank do not match. Looks like the Ministry
of Finance uses exchange rate different from the ofﬁcial
exchange rate provided by the central bank. Also the
Ministry of Finance have few months delay in providing
data of investment earnings by the National fund and
provides quarterly investment earnings in monthly reports.
This makes the monthly value of assets provided by the
Ministry of Finance not as accurate as annual.
Dummy variables indicate periods over which signiﬁ-
cant changes in ﬁscal policy were made, either in oil
taxation or in rules of the National fund. Table 3 indicates
periods over which dummy variables equal one.5.2. Unit root test
The time series causes a set of problems; therefore, it
is important to study the characteristics of the data
available. In particular, the time series are often nonsta-
tionary. It is important to know whether or not time se-
ries variables have a unit root (Davidson & MacKinnon,
2004) because the distribution of estimators and test
statistics associated with a nonstationary regressor mayTable 4
The results of unit root test.
Variable Trend Breusch–Godfrey
Real world oil price Yes 1.398
Oil production Yes 1.032
Real GIR Yes 2.330
Fund’s real net revenue Yes 0.029
REER No 0.085
Real government expenditure Yes 1.816
Real value of oil produced Yes 0.467
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
I(0) – stationary and I(1) – nonstationary.be very different from those associated with a stationary
regressor. The problem with a regression of a highly
persistent time series (with a unit root process) is that it
can lead to misleading results if the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) assumptions are violated. A solution to this
problem is to use the error correction model (ECM) with
the ﬁrst differences of the variables instead of OLS
regression. Therefore we started by testing characteristics
of the data available before regression.
To test for unit root (nonstationarity), the Dickey–Fuller
(DF) test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) was applied – the simplest
and most widely used test for unit root. The DF test can
include drift and a trend:
Dyt ¼ mþ gyt1 þ 3t (42)
and
Dyt ¼ mþ bt þ gyt1 þ 3t ; (43)
where the null hypothesis H0 : g ¼ 0 (yt is nonsta-
tionary) is tested against the alternative hypothesis
H1 : g < 0 (yt is stationary). Time trend was included
where necessary according to visual presence of a time
trend. If the series tend to increase or decrease over time,
DF/ADF test with drift and time trend was applied. In the
presence of autocorrelation the DF test is not valid. On the
subject of autocorrelation, several tests have been sug-
gested for its detection: the Breusch–Godfrey Lagrange
multiplier (LM) test (Breusch & Godfrey, 1981), Box and
Pierce’s test (Box & Pierce, 1970), Ljung–Box test (Ljung &
Box,1978) and the Durbin–Watson test (Durbin &Watson,
1950, 1951, 1971). Until recently, the most commonly used
test was the Durbin–Watson test for the ﬁrst order auto-
correlation. Nowadays, the Breusch–Godfrey Lagrangetest, chi-sq Lags DF/ADF test Result
2 3.333* I(1)
0 1.728 I(1)
0 1.385 I(1)
0 6.511*** I(0)
2 2.387 I(1)
0 14.480*** I(0)
2 2.627 I(1)
Table 6
The results of Johansen cointegration test.
Variables AIC HQIC SBIC Rank Result
The value of oil production
and oil price
4 2 0 1 CI
GIR and the value of
oil production
1 0 0 1 CI
REER and the value of
oil production
2 2 2 1 CI
CI – cointegration.
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popular because it can be applied in a wider set of cir-
cumstances and can test for higher order serial correlation
(Wooldridge, 2009). The null for the Breusch–Godfrey LM
test H0: no serial correlation in 3t is tested against alter-
native hypotheses H1 : 3t is AR(p) or MA(p). The test sta-
tistics is calculated by estimating the following regression:
et ¼ x0tgþ 91et1 þ/þ 9petp þ ut ; (44)
where et is residual from equation (42) or (43). The test
statistics is TR2. Under H0 we have T/N,
LM ¼ TR2wc2p:
There is an evidence of autocorrelation in variables real
world oil price, REER and value of oil produced. In order to
remove serial correlation from the residuals, we added
enough lags using the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test.
ADF test can include a drift and a trend:
Dyt ¼ mþ gyt1 þ
Xp1
i¼1
giDyti þ 3t (45)
and
Dyt ¼ mþ bt þ gyt1 þ
Xp1
i¼1
giDyti þ 3t : (46)
The test of the hypothesis in ADF test is the same as in
DF test. In deciding whether to reject or accept the null
hypothesis, we used a non-standard Dickey–Fuller distri-
bution. In order to reject the null hypothesis, the DF test
statistics must be signiﬁcantly negative. The appropriate50
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Fig. 13. Correlation between Kazakhstan’s oil production and oil price. Data souramount of lags was determined using the Schwatrz’s
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) by Schwarz (1978),
the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) by Akaike (1974)
and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC)
by Hannan and Quinn (1979). Using the number of lags
suggested by information criterions, the serial correlation
in the residuals from equations (45) and (46) was tested
using Breusch–Godfrey LM test. In variables real world oil
price, REER and the value of oil produced serial correlation
was removed using 2 lags. The results of DF/ADF unit root
test shows that all variables are nonstationary except
accumulation of the National fund and government
expenditure (Table 4).
5.3. Cointegration test
The results of unit root tests show that most of variables
are nonstationary. There is a possibility of cointegration
between oil production and oil price, gross international
reserves and value of oil production, REER and value of oil
production. Cointegration between two series means that
there is a long-run relationship between them. There are
two cointegration tests Johansen’s (Johansen, 1991) and
Engle–Granger (Engle & Granger, 1987). If both series are
cointegrated a linear combination of them must be sta-
tionary. To apply Engle–Granger test we estimated re-
siduals and then applied DF or ADF test without drift and
trend on predicted residuals. DF test was applied if there is
no serial correlation while ADF test was applied if there is
serial correlation. Serial correlation was tested using
Breusch–Godfrey LM test and the appropriate amount of
lags was determined using information criterions SBIC, AIC
and HQIC. If predicted residuals are nonstationary there is
no cointegration, if predicted residuals are stationary there
is cointegration. The results of Engle–Granger test showed
the presence of cointegration between oil production and
oil price, gross international reserves and value of oil pro-
duction, REER and value of oil production (Table 5).
Johansen’s test determines the number of cointegrating
relationships among variables or cointegration rank. For
this test we need to rewrite VAR model as follows:80 100 120
 USD/barrel
ce: The Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.
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Fig. 14. Kazakhstan’s oil production and oil price. Data source: The Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.
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Xpþ1
i¼1
Fiyti þ 3t (47)
in the vector error correction model (VECM) form:
Dyt ¼ Bxt þPyt1 þ
Xp
i¼1
GiDyti þ 3t : (48)
If rank ofP¼ 0 there is no cointegration, if rank ofP¼ 1
there is one cointegrating vector and if rank of P ¼ 2 there
is full rank. The number of lags (p) was determined using
information criterions HQIC, SBIC and AIC. According to
Schwert (1989) the maximum lag length should be at least
equal to 12ðT=1000Þ1=4, where T denotes the number of
periods for which data is available. The number of lags
suggested by information criterions is different, but they all
provide the same result about presence of cointegration
(Table 6).
Johansen’s test conﬁrms cointegration between oil
production and oil price, gross international reserves and
the real value of oil production, REER and the real value of
oil production. This means that there is a long-run rela-
tionship between oil production and oil price; gross0
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Fig. 15. Correlation between the National fund’s revenue and oil production of K
available at www.nationalbank.kz; and the Energy Information Administration, avainternational reserves and the value of oil production; and
REER and the value of oil production.
5.4. Econometric speciﬁcation
This section provides an empirical model to test the
theoretical model developed in the previous section. The
theoretical model suggests that taxes reduce the oil
exploration and reduce the extraction of oil. From equa-
tions (24), (32) and (40), the oil production function is
speciﬁed as a function of oil price, taxes, cost of production
and the cost of oil exploration.
Qit ¼ Si
	
pðtÞit ; sðtÞit ; xt;;CðqÞit ;CðRÞit


: (49)
In this section only data from Kazakhstan was used;
other countries’ data was not included. Due to data limita-
tions, the cost of oil extraction and the cost of oil exploration
in Kazakhstan were not included. Therefore, equation (49)
was simpliﬁed to a log linear speciﬁcation in which oil
production is a positive function of the oil price and tax rates
of value-added tax and tax on oil export. Unfortunately, it100000 150000
usnad USD/day
azakhstan. Data sources: The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
ilable at www.eia.doe.gov.
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Fig. 16. The National fund’s real net revenue. Data sources: The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.nationalbank.kz.
D. Azhgaliyeva / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 157–183174was impossible to include royalties tax in the model as its
rates vary according to the quantity of oil produced by each
oil producer, so oil producers pay tax at different rates. Other
taxes were impossible to include as most of them were
changed simultaneously in 2004 and were valid until the
end of 2008. Thus, in themodel, a dummyvariable 2004was
included, which indicates the period 2004–2008 when tax
rates were changed signiﬁcantly. Many tax rates were
changed recently in January 2009. That is why dummy
variable 2009 indicates the period from 2009.
Figs. 13 and 14 show a positive relationship between oil
production and oil prices. Equation (49) shows a relation-
ship between oil prices and oil production.
To show the effect of ﬁscal policy on oil production we
estimate the effect of real world oil price, oil export tax, VAT
and changes in oil taxation in 2004 and 2009 on oil pro-
duction in Kazakhstan. This model is based on the ﬁndings
of the theoretical model in Section 4. Oil production and oil
price are nonstationary and cointegrated according to unit
root and cointegration tests, which means that they have
long-run relationship. In order to estimate models
involving nonstationary variables we use ﬁrst differences of
those variables to correct for nonstationarity. Since there is
a long-run relationship between cointegrated variables we0
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Fig. 17. Real government expenditure and the real value of oil production. Data sour
minﬁn.kz; and the Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.goapplied error correction model (ECM) which captures long-
run and short-run relationships:
Dqt ¼ let1 þ
Xp
i¼1
aiDqti þ
Xp
i¼0
diDxti þ εt ; (50)
where D is a ﬁrst difference, q is a log of a monthly pro-
duction of oil in Kazakhstan, x are explanatory variables
which are a log of theworld oil price, a rate of a value-added
tax in Kazakhstan, a rate of tax on oil exports in Kazakhstan
(according to current world oil price), dummy variables
indicationperiodswhen signiﬁcant changeswere applied in
the taxation of oil in 2004 (equals one if the period 2004–
2008 and equals zero otherwise), and when signiﬁcant
changes were applied in the taxation of oil in 2009 (equals
one if the period from 2009 and equals zero otherwise).
Oil revenue is all taxes paid by oil producers. Theﬁrst part
of oil revenue was deposited in oil revenue fund of
Kazakhstan (theNational fund) in January 2001. The amount
of oil revenuewhichmust be deposited in the National fund
and which can be withdrawn to the budget deﬁned ac-
cording to accumulation and withdrawal rules of the Na-
tional fund. Thus, the National fund’s revenue dependence
on rules of the National fund, taxes on oil, oil prices and oil100000 150000
usand USD/day
ces: The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.
v.
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Fig. 18. Kazakhstan’s GIR and oil production. Data sources: The National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at www.nationalbank.kz; and the Energy
Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.
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fund’s net revenue and the value of oil production. Fig. 16
shows real net revenue of the National fund.
The real net revenue of the National fund is a stationary
variable, while the value of oil production is a nonsta-
tionary variable. We used ﬁrst differences of nonstationary
variables to correct for nonstationarity:
rt ¼ aþ
Xq
i¼0
Xk
j¼0
bijFUNDjDpqti þ
Xq
i¼0
Xn
j¼0
gijTAXjDpqti;
(51)
where r is the log of the real net revenue of the National
fund, pq is the log of the real value of oil produced, FUNDj
are dummy variables indicating periods over which rules
were signiﬁcantly changed in July 2006 (equals one if the
period July 2006–December 2008 and equals zero other-
wise) and 2009 (equals one if the period from 2009 and
equals one otherwise) and TAXj are variables indicating
changes in oil taxation such as a rate of oil export tax, VAT,
dummy variables indicating periods over which taxes on oil
were changed 2004 (equals one if the period 2004–200880
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Fig. 19. REER and oil production. Data sources: The National Bank of the Republic o
Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.and equals zero otherwise) and 2009 (equals one if the
period from 2009 and equals zero otherwise).
The National fund’s accumulation and withdrawal rules
put constraints on the government expenditure. Fig. 17
shows a relationship between the real government
expenditure and the real value of oil produced.
To show the effect of the National fund on government
expenditure we test real value of oil production and its
interaction terms with the existence of the National fund
and changes in rules of the National fund on the real gov-
ernment expenditure. Since the real government expendi-
ture is stationary variable, while the real value of oil
production is nonstationary data, we use ﬁrst differences of
nonstationary variables to correct for nonstationarity:
gt ¼ aþ
Xq
i¼0
Xk
j¼0
dijFUNDjDpqti þ
Xq
i¼0
Xn
j¼0
gijTAXjDpqti;
(52)
where g is the log of the real government expenditure.
The National fund invests its revenue in foreign assets.
About 90 percent of foreign assets in the National fund are100000 150000
usand USD/day
f Kazakhstan, available at www.nationalbank.kz; and the Energy Information
Table 8
The results of Breusch–Pagan heteroskedasticity test.
Model Chi-sq Result
Real government expenditure 6.80*** Heteroskedasticity
Fund’s real net revenue 2.84*** Homoskedastisity
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
Table 9
Empirical results of oil production.
Oil production in log
(ﬁrst difference)
Lags ECM1 ECM2 ECM3
Oil production in log
(ﬁrst difference)
1 0.154** 0.137* 0.116
2 0.277*** 0.288*** 0.246***
3 0.205** 0.187*** 0.136*
4 0.063 0.067 0.105
5 0.146** 0.140** 0.115
Real oil price in log
(ﬁrst difference)
1 0.027 0.030 0.047
2 0.034 0.032 0.035
3 0.033 0.027 0.008
4 0.021 0.028 0.046
5 0.013 0.005 0.034
Export tax 1 0.001 0.002
2 0.000 0.000
3 0.001 0.002
4 0.000 0.006**
5 0.001 0.001
VAT 1 0.003 0.007
2 0.002 0.000
3 0.002 0.003
4 0.006 0.005
5 0.012* 0.007
Taxes 2004 1 0.100
2 0.016
3 0.018
4 0.001
5 0.023
Taxes 2009 1 0.055
2 0.035
3 0.017
D. Azhgaliyeva / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 157–183176gross international reserves. Gross international reserves
and the value of oil production are nonstationary and
cointegrated variables. Fig. 18 shows relationship between
the real GIR and the value of oil produced. In order to es-
timate models involving nonstationary variables we use
ﬁrst differences of those variables to correct for non-
stationarity. Since there is a long-run relationship between
cointegrated variables we applied ECM:
Dgirt ¼ let1 þ
Xp
i¼1
aiDgirti þ
Xq
i¼0
diDxti þ 3; (53)
where gir is a log of real gross international reserves of the
National fund and x are explanatory variables which are a
rate of a value-added tax in Kazakhstan, a rate of tax on oil
exports in Kazakhstan (according to world oil price),
dummy variables indication periods when signiﬁcant
changes were applied in the taxation of oil in 2004 (equals
one if the period 2004–2008 and equals zero otherwise),
and when signiﬁcant changes were applied in the taxation
of oil in 2009 (equals one if the period from 2009 and
equals zero otherwise), a log of the real value of oil pro-
duction, its interaction terms with dummy variables indi-
cating periods over which fund exists (equals one if the
period from 2001 and equals zero otherwise) and rules
were signiﬁcantly changed in July 2006 (equals one if the
period July 2006–December 2008 and equals zero other-
wise) and 2009 (equals one if the period from 2009 and
equals zero otherwise).
One of the objectives of the National fund is to protect
exchange rate of local currency, tenge, from windfalls of
foreign currency which Kazakhstan receives as oil revenue.
The National fund invests a part of oil revenue in foreign
assets to take foreign currency abroad. For this reason do-
mestic investment by the National fund is not allowed. To
show the effect of the National fund on REER we test the
effect of the value of oil production, the existence of the
National fund and changes in rules in July 2006 and in
January 2009 on REER.
Fig. 19 shows relationship between REER and the real
value of oil produced. REER and the real value of oil pro-
duction are nonstationary and cointegrated variables. In
order to estimate models involving nonstationary variables
we use ﬁrst differences of those variables to correct for
nonstationarity. Since there is a long-run relationship be-
tween cointegrated variables we applied error correction
model (ECM):
Dreert ¼ let1 þ
Xp
i¼1
aiDreerti þ
Xq
i¼0
diDxti þ 3t ; (54)Table 7
The results of Breusch–Godfrey LM post estimation test.
Model Chi-sq with
no lags
Lags Chi-sq
with lags
Real government expenditure 128*** 13 1.891
Fund’s real net revenue 68*** 1 0.032
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.where reert is a log of the real effective exchange rate and x
are explanatory variables which are a rate of a value-added
tax in Kazakhstan, a rate of tax on oil exports in Kazakhstan
(according to current world oil price), dummy variables
indication periods when signiﬁcant changes were applied
in the taxation of oil in 2004 (equals one if the period
2004–2008 and equals zero otherwise), and when signiﬁ-
cant changes were applied in the taxation of oil in 2009
(equals one if the period from 2009 equals zero otherwise),
a log of the real value of oil production, its interaction terms
with dummy variables indicating periods over which fund4 0.102
5 0.043
Error correction
term
1 0.018** 0.011** 0.000
Constant 0 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***
Number of
observations
226 226 226
Chi-squared 44*** 51*** 55***
R-squared 0.171 0.202 0.223
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.
Table 10
Empirical results of GIR.
Gross international reserves in log (ﬁrst difference) Lags ECM1 ECM2 ECM3 ECM4
Gross international reserves in log (ﬁrst difference) 1 0.124* 0.105 0.103 0.120
2 0.033 0.034 0.043 0.040
3 0.073 0.003 0.070 0.051
4 0.015 0.077 0.020 0.034
5 0.143** 0.169** 0.126* 0.150**
6 0.133** 0.076 0.138** 0.144**
The value of oil produced in log (ﬁrst difference) 1 0.077 0.015 0.083 0.036
2 0.014 0.001 0.023 0.015
3 0.034 0.049 0.018 0.006
4 0.039 0.042 0.020 0.017
5 0.017 0.002 0.020 0.003
6 0.051 0.104* 0.055 0.052
Export tax 1 0.000
2 0.007
3 0.004
4 0.002
5 0.005
6 0.007
VAT 1 0.004
2 0.003
3 0.014
4 0.017
5 0.005
6 0.004
Taxes 2004 1 0.044
2 0.192
3 0.093
4 0.078
5 0.062
6 0.208
Taxes 2009 1 0.058
2 0.154
3 0.047
4 0.109
5 0.237**
6 0.004
Interaction with the ﬁrst difference of the value of oil produced
Fund exists 1 0.003 0.001
2 0.001 0.003
3 0.002 0.000
4 0.010 0.013**
5 0.006 0.008
6 0.002 0.003
Fund 2001 1 0.000
2 0.002
3 0.001
4 0.013**
5 0.007
6 0.001
Fund 2006 1 0.004
2 0.004
3 0.007
4 0.011
5 0.014
6 0.005
Fund 2009 1 0.004
2 0.007
3 0.011
4 0.009
5 0.003
6 0.012
Error correction term 1 0.049*** 0.027* 0.066*** 0.063***
1 0.067*** 0.052** 0.045**
1 0.002 0.002
1 0.002
Constant 0 0.009* 0.003 0.002 0.004
Number of observations 225 215 225 215
R-squared 0.186 0.251 0.241 0.294
Chi-squared 48*** 57 62*** 75***
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otherwise) and rules were signiﬁcantly changed in July
2006 (equals one if the period July 2006–December 2008
and equals zero otherwise) and 2009 (equals one if the
period from 2009 and equals zero otherwise).
The lag length (p) selection is very important in ECM.
We can use the lag length as suggested for Johansen’s
cointegration test (Nielsen, 2006). However to determine
the lag length for Johansen cointegration test we used
variables in levels, but for ECM we need to use ﬁrst differ-
ences of variables. Thus we can use lag length as suggested
for Johansen’s cointegration test less one lag. Information
criterions HQIC, SBIC and AIC suggest different amount of
lags (Table 6). We used the amount of lags which is sug-
gested by AIC. According to Ivanov and Kilian (2005) AIC
tends to be more accurate with monthly data.
Usually we estimate OLS by assuming that the classical
assumptions hold, and then attempt to test whether those
assumptions appear to be satisﬁed by the estimated model.
According to the Gauss-Markov theorem, the OLS estima-
tors are the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) if the
following conditions are satisﬁed: exogeneity of indepen-
dent variables, homoskedasticity and non autocorrelation
in the errors. There is a need to test for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation in models with dependent variables
government expenditure and fund’s revenue.
Breusch–Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation was
applied after estimation of models with dependent vari-
able government expenditure and fund’s revenue. The
results of Breusch–Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
showed presence of autocorrelation in both models (Table
6). The optimal amount of lags of dependent variable to
correct for serial correlation was chosen using information
criterions HQIC, SBIC and AIC. The Breusch–Godfrey LM
test was applied again with suggested amount of lags to
make sure that there are enough lags to correct for serialTable 11
Empirical results of fund’s revenue.
Fund’s revenue in log Lags DM1
Fund’s revenue in log 1 0.
The value of oil produced in log (ﬁrst difference) 0 0.
1 0.
Export tax 0
1
VAT 0
1
Taxes 2004 0
1
Taxes 2009 0
1
Interaction terms with the ﬁrst difference of the value of oil produced
Fund 2006 0
1
Fund 2009 0
1
Constant 0 2.
Number of observations 133
F-statistics 30***
Adjusted R-squared 0.
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
***Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.correlation. The results show no presence of serial corre-
lation in both models if lagged dependent variables added
(Table 7).
The autocorrelation in models can be corrected by
including lagged dependent variables:
rt ¼ aþ
Xp
i¼1
dirti þ
Xq
i¼0
Xk
j¼0
bijFUNDjDpqti
þ
Xq
i¼0
Xn
j¼0
gijTAXjDpqti þ 3t
(55)
and
gt ¼ aþ
Xp
i¼1
diqti þ
Xq
i¼0
Xk
j¼0
bijFUNDjDpqti
þ
Xq
i¼0
Xn
j¼0
gijTAXjDpqti3t :
(56)
Several tests have been suggested for the detection of
heteroskedasticity: the Goldfeld–Quandt test (Goldfeld &
Quandt, 1965), the Breusch–Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan,
1979) and White’s test (White, 1980). The method
employed to test for heteroskedasticity in this chapter is
the Breusch–Pagan with the null hypothesis of constant
variance in errors. The results of Breusch–Pagan hetero-
skedasticity test showed absence of heteroskedasticity in
the model with dependent variable the real net revenue of
the National fund. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity
cannot be rejected at ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance
(Table 8). However their results showed presence of het-
eroskedasticity in the model with dependent variable
government expenditure. The null hypothesis of homo-
skedasticity can be rejected at ﬁve percent level of signiﬁ-
cance (Table 8). In this case regressions can be corrected for
heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors.DM2 DM3 DM4
627*** 0.562*** 0.530*** 0.630***
271 0.480 1.041 0.253
646 1.155 0.297 0.477
0.077** 0.179**
0.067** 0.205**
0.421 0.735*
0.560** 0.368
2.817
1.097
9.093***
7.564***
0.022
0.018
0.041
0.011
188*** 4.669*** 8.621*** 2.180***
133 133 133
17*** 14*** 13***
405 0.464 0.531 0.389
Table 12
Government expenditure
Government expenditure in log Lag DM1 robust DM2 robust DM3 robust
Government expenditure in log 1 0.273*** 0.252*** 0.197
2 0.099** 0.135** 0.111*
3 0.091 0.089 0.057
4 0.039 0.048 0.038
5 0.004 0.023 0.007
6 0.086 0.083 0.106
7 0.031 0.029 0.066
8 0.028 0.019 0.021
9 0.002 0.016 0.009
10 0.050 0.044 0.913
11 0.097 0.100 0.108
12 0.770*** 0.741*** 0.764***
13 0.225** 0.222** 0.148
The value of oil produced in log (ﬁrst difference) 0 0.079 0.049 0.054
1 0.561*** 0.515*** 0.574**
2 0.060 0.110 0.022
3 0.013 0.041 0.289
4 0.212 0.222 0.313
5 0.047 0.009 0.026
6 0.088 0.005 0.008
7 0.201 0.191 0.338
8 0.176 0.157 0.092
9 0.532 0.537*** 0.607**
10 0.075 0.002 0.056
11 0.287* 0.251 0.171
12 0.247 0.268 0.256
13 0.095 0.068 0.073
Interaction terms with the ﬁrst difference of the value of oil produced
Fund exists 0 0.008
1 0.006
2 0.027**
3 0.009
4 0.023**
5 0.001
6 0.011
7 0.004
8 0.003
9 0.009
10 0.011
11 0.011
12 0.028***
13 0.035***
Fund 2001 0 0.010
1 0.006
2 0.019
3 0.015
4 0.015
5 0.001
6 0.015
7 0.007
8 0.002
9 0.008
10 0.006
11 0.000
12 0.039**
13 0.031**
Fund 2006 0 0.022
1 0.016
2 0.005
3 0.013
4 0.026
5 0.049**
6 0.007
7 0.032*
8 0.004
9 0.002
10 0.018
11 0.008
12 0.032
13 0.013
(continued on next page)
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Table 12 (continued )
Government expenditure in log Lag DM1 robust DM2 robust DM3 robust
Fund 2009 0 0.051*
1 0.051*
2 0.004
3 0.005
4 0.016
5 0.16
6 0.019
7 0.050**
8 0.012
9 0.002
10 0.005
11 0.014
12 0.050
13 0.014
Constant 0 0.157* 0.157* 0.189
F-statistics 211*** 5855*** 23,830***
Adjusted R-squared 0.964 0.967 0.974
Number of observations 159 159 159
D. Azhgaliyeva / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 157–1831805.5. Empirical results
Oil production and real world oil price have long-run
relationship according to the results of cointegration test.
The results of effect of ﬁscal policy on oil production in
Kazakhstan are presented in Table 9. The long-run rela-
tionship between oil production and oil price is captured
by the error correction term. The short-run effects on oil
production are captured by coefﬁcients of other explana-
tory variables. The results show that in short-run there is
no statistically signiﬁcant effect of real world oil price on
oil production in Kazakhstan. The results show that tax on
oil exports and VAT have statistically signiﬁcant negative
effect on oil production. The negative effect of oil export
tax has four months lag on oil production. The negative
effect of VAT has ﬁve months lag on oil production. The
results show that changes in oil taxation in 2004 and in
2009 did not have statistically signiﬁcant effect on oil
production.
GIR and the value of oil production have long-run
relationship according to the results of cointegration test.
The results of effect of ﬁscal policy on GIR are presented in
Table 10. The long-run relationship between GIR and the
real value of oil production is captured by the error
correction term. The short-run effect on GIR is captured by
coefﬁcients of other explanatory variables. The results
show no positive effect of the real value of oil production on
GIR. There is no statistically signiﬁcant effect of taxes on
GIR. The existence of the National fund is not associated
with greater GIR. Changes of rules of the National fund from
July 2006 and January 2009 had no statistically signiﬁcant
effect on GIR.
The results of the effect of ﬁscal policy on the real net
revenue of the National fund are presented in Table 11. The
results show positive but statistically not signiﬁcant effect
of the real value of oil produced on the real net revenue of
the National fund. Changes in taxes on oil have negative
effect on the real net revenue of the National fund. An in-
crease/decrease of a tax rate on oil export by one per-
centage point causes a decrease/increase in the real net
revenue of the National fund by 0.01 percent. An increase/decrease of a rate of VAT by one percentage point causes a
decrease/increase in the real net revenue of the National
fund by 0.139 percent. Changes in oil taxation in 2004 did
not have statistically signiﬁcant effect on the real net rev-
enue of the National fund. Changes in oil taxation in 2009
have statistically signiﬁcant negative effect on the real net
revenue of the National fund. From 2009 the real net rev-
enue of the National fund decreased by 1.529 percent. The
results show no statistically signiﬁcant effect of changes in
rules of the National fund on the real net revenue of the
National fund from July 2006 and 2009.
The results of the effect of the National fund on gov-
ernment expenditure are presented in Table 12. The results
show that the real value of oil produced has statistically
signiﬁcant positive effect on real government expenditure.
This means that in Kazakhstan government expenditure is
correlated with the value of oil produced. If the ﬁrst dif-
ference in the value of oil produced increases/decreases by
one percent, the estimated government expenditure in-
creases/decreases by 0.274 percent. In order to stabilize
economy the National fund was established. The results
show that the National fund is effective in stabilizing gov-
ernment expenditure. After the establishment of the Na-
tional fund in 2001 the effect of the ﬁrst difference of the
value of oil production on the government expenditure is
reduced by 0.013 percent. This means that after the
establishment of the National fund the increase/decrease of
the ﬁrst difference of the value of oil production causes
increase/decreases of the government expenditure by
0.261 percent. After the establishment of the National fund
in 2001 the accumulation and withdrawal rules were
signiﬁcantly changed from July 2006 and January 2009. We
tested which rules made the National fund effective. The
results show that all rules, which were set in 2001, July
2006 and 2009, made fund effective. The results show that
the National fund was mostly effective over the period
2001–June 2006. The National fund wasmost effective over
the period 2001–June 2006, less effective over the period
from 2009 and the least effective over the period July
2006–2009. This does not necessary mean that rules which
were set in 2001 were most successful. Over period 2001–
Table 13
Empirical results of REER.
REER in log
(ﬁrst difference)
Lags ECM1 ECM2 ECM7
REER in log
(ﬁrst difference)
1 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.193***
2 0.017 0.023 0.006
3 0.044 0.048 0.052
4 0.020 0.019 0.010
5 0.047 0.056 0.076
6 0.036 0.040 0.062
7 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.287***
The value of oil
produced in log
(ﬁrst difference)
1 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.055**
2 0.017 0.010 0.006
3 0.001 0.004 0.033
4 0.010 0.017 0.032
5 0.002 0.008 0.015
6 0.021 0.018 0.001
7 0.005 0.012 0.017
Interaction terms with the ﬁrst difference of the value of oil produced
Fund exists 1 0.002
2 0.002
3 0.001
4 0.001
5 0.002
6 0.000
7 0.002
Fund 2001 1 0.002
2 0.001
3 0.001
4 0.000
5 0.001
6 0.001
7 0.002
Fund 2006 1 0.002
2 0.000
3 0.000
4 0.001
5 0.001
6 0.002
7 0.003
Fund 2009 1 0.016***
2 0.003
3 0.000
4 0.001
5 0.000
6 0.005
7 0.001
Error correction
term
1 0.057** 0.079*** 0.074**
1 0.009** 0.012*
1 0.002*
1 0.001
Constant 0 0.006* 0.009** 0.013**
Number of
observations
212 212 212
R-squared 0.204 0.227 0.372
Chi-squared 50*** 55*** 102***
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sharply decreased, probably that is a reason why over the
period July 2006–2008 the National fund was least
successful.
REER and the real value of oil production have long-run
relationship according to the results of cointegration test.
The results of the effect of ﬁscal policy on REER are pre-
sented in Table 13. The long-run relationship between REER
and the real value of oil production is captured by the error
correction term. The short-run effects on REER are captured
by coefﬁcients of other explanatory variables. The results
show that the real value of oil production has positive butstatistically not signiﬁcant effect on REER. Surprisingly the
results even show statistically signiﬁcant negative effect of
the real value of oil production on REER if taxes on oil as
explanatory variables are added. This is probably because
the rate of tax on oil export positively depends on oil price.
Changes in oil taxation in 2004 had negative but statisti-
cally not signiﬁcant effect on REER. Changes in oil taxation
in 2009 associated with reduction in the ﬁrst difference of
REER by 0.109 percent. The National fund is effective in
stabilizing REER. However when we control for changes in
rules of the National fund, the results show that the
changes in rules of the National fund in 2009 are effective
in stabilizing REER due to the real value of oil production.
The results of the effect of dummy variables indicating
periods over which signiﬁcant changes in oil taxation or
rules of the National fund were made are limited. It is not
necessary that only those changes in oil taxation or rules of
the National fund had effect on dependent variables. There
is a possibility that other changes which took place during
those periods affected dependent variables. Also the above
results are limited with the sample size. Kazakhstan is a
young country, so the period of coverage is not very large,
especially for the regressions on the National fund as it was
only established in 2001. Also, results are limited because in
the regressions only data from Kazakhstan was used.
Regression of panel data, including other oil-producing
countries, would allow us to estimate the effect of other
variables such as transparency of the fund, withdrawal
rules, accumulation rules, management of the fund and so
on. Another limitation is that oil price during the sample
period mostly increased, and the period when oil prices
decreased is very short (Fig. 20).
6. Conclusion
This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence
of the effect of taxes on oil production. Also this paper
provides empirical evidence of the effect of ﬁscal policy on
the National fund’s revenue, gross international reserves,
REER and government expenditure in Kazakhstan.
The National fund’s revenue is accumulated from ﬁscal
oil revenue from selected companies and other non-ﬁscal
revenues. Thus, ﬁscal policy must have a signiﬁcant effect
on the National fund and its effectiveness. Although there is
some literature showing the effect of a fund on the econ-
omy, in this chapter it is shown that not only the existence
of National fund but rules are important. In this chapter, the
term ﬁscal policy is narrowed down to include only taxa-
tion of oil, the existence of the National fund and its
accumulation and withdrawal rules.
Fiscal policy affects oil revenue funds directly since the
fund is accumulated from ﬁscal oil revenue from selected
companies, and indirectly affects extraction and explora-
tion of resources. Taxation of resources is a combination of
per unit, per revenue and lump sum taxes. An appropriate
design of ﬁscal policy is signiﬁcant in avoiding high vola-
tility of oil revenue: an ad valorem tax allows for higher
revenue when resource price is high; a per unit tax allows a
country to receive resource revenue even when the
resource price is low; and a lump sum tax allows a country
to receive revenue even when the level of oil production is
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Fig. 20. World oil prices. Data source: The Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov.
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valorem taxes (royalties, tax on oil exports, value-added
tax). This allows the country to receive higher revenue
when resource price is high. Also, oil producers pay lump
sum taxes. This allows the country to receive revenue even
when the level of oil production is low. However, there is no
per unit tax on oil in Kazakhstan, which would allow the
country to secure itself by receiving oil revenue evenwhen
oil price is low.
It is straightforward to calculate the effect of ﬁscal policy
on an oil revenue fund for a given level of production. That
is why in this chapter a developed theoretical model and an
empirical model show the effect of the taxation of re-
sources (value-added tax, tax on oil exports and signiﬁcant
changes in oil taxation in 2004 and 2009) on its production.
The theoretical results show that taxes on oil have a
negative effect on exploration and extraction. The effect of
value-added tax depends on the share of oil sold in the
domestic market to the total oil production. Since, in
Kazakhstan, the portion of exported oil is very large, the
theoretical model predicts that value-added tax have a
small effect on oil production in Kazakhstan. The empirical
results show a statistically not signiﬁcant effect of value-
added tax on oil production in Kazakhstan. The effect of
tax on oil exports also depends on the share of exported oil
in total production. Since, in Kazakhstan, the portion of oil
exports is very large, the theoretical model predicts a sig-
niﬁcant effect of this tax on oil exports. The tax on oil ex-
ports in Kazakhstan is a price-dependent ad valorem tax.
The theoretical model shows that not only does the rate
itself have a negative effect on oil exploration and extrac-
tion, but also the rate at which the tax increases compared
to oil price growth. When oil prices grow at a rate greater
than the tax rate on oil exports, the negative effect of this
tax is smaller. The rate of tax on oil exports in Kazakhstan
from 2004 to 2008 grew at a greater rate than oil prices,
and the difference is larger for smaller prices and smaller
for larger prices. Thus, the theoretical model predicts a
negative effect of tax on oil exports and oil production and
this negative effect is greater at lower oil prices and lower
at greater oil prices. The royalties tax rates in Kazakhstan
are set at an increasing scale depending on the amount of
oil extracted. The theoretical model shows that theroyalties tax has a negative effect on oil exploration and
extraction. The negative effect of the royalties tax is
stronger when the tax rate of royalties grows at a greater
rate than oil production. Such is the case in Kazakhstan
from 2004 to 2008 during which the royalties tax rate grew
at a greater rate for larger amount of oil production and at a
smaller growth rate for smaller amounts of oil produced.
Thus, the theoretical model predicts that the royalties tax
has a negative effect on oil production and this effect is less
negative for a smaller amount of oil production and greater
for a larger amount of oil production.
In order to support theoretical model, the effects of
ﬁscal policy on oil production, the National Fund’s revenue
and gross international reserves in Kazakhstan were esti-
mated. These regressions used data from Kazakhstan over
the period January 1994–July 2013. The results from the
theoretical model on the effect of oil taxation are supported
by empirical results, which provide a statistically signiﬁ-
cant negative effect of VAT and oil export tax on oil pro-
duction. The problem with the regression of changes in
taxation is that often these changes take place simulta-
neously from 1st January; thus, it is difﬁcult to estimate the
effect of each tax independently. The effect of the royalties
tax on oil production was impossible to test empirically
because the rate of the royalties tax vary with the amount
of oil extracted, so tax rates differ with oil producers. Ac-
cording to cointegration test oil production and oil price
have long-run relationship, but empirical results showed
no statistically signiﬁcant short-run effect of oil price on oil
production. The empirical regression shows no effect of the
value of oil produced on the real GIR. The existence of the
National fund and changes in their rules are not associated
with greater GIR. The regression on the National fund’s
revenue shows that the value of oil produced has no effect
on the real net revenue of the National fund. Empirical
results show that the real government expenditure and the
real value of oil produced are correlated. The National fund
reduced correlation between the real government expen-
diture and the real value of oil produced. Empirical results
show that the real value of oil produced has no positive
effect on REER. The National fund has no effect on REER.
To show how other policies affect the National fund and
its effectiveness, such as transparency, withdraw rules,
D. Azhgaliyeva / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 157–183 183accumulation rules and other taxes, further studies with
panel data regression including other oil-producing coun-
tries are needed.References
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